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I. DISCOVERY
A. Rules of Discovery
After many years of silence on the issue, the Supreme Court of Florida
has in recent years begun to develop a body of law respecting penalty phase
discovery. In May of 1995, the court proposed the following rule:1
RULE 3.202 EXPERT TESTIMONY OF MENTAL MITIGATION
DURING PENALTY PHASE OF CAPITAL TRIAL: NOTICE AND
EXAMINATION BY STATE EXPERT
(a) Notice of Intent to Present Expert Testimony of Mental
Mitigation. When in any capital case it shall be the intentiofi of the
defendant to present, during the penalty phase of the trial, expert
testimony of a mental health professional, who has tested, evaluated, or
examined the defendant, in order to establish statutory or nonstatutory
mental mitigating circumstances, the defendant shall give written notice
of intent to present such testimony.
(b) Time for Filing Notice; Contents. The defendant shall give
notice of intent to present expert testimony of mental mitigation no later
than 45 days before the guilt phase of the capital trial. The notice shall
contain a statement of particulars listing the statutory and nonstatutory
mental mitigating circumstances the defendant expects to establish
through expert testimony and the names and addresses of the mental

1. The impetus for the rule arose from Bums v. State, 609 So. 2d 600, 606 n.8 (Fla.
1992), in which the court asked the Criminal Rules Committee to develop a procedure for
the state's mental evaluation of a defendant for capital sentencing purposes.
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health experts by whom the defendant expects to establish mental
mitigation, insofar as is possible.
(c) Appointment of State Expert; Time of Examination. After the
filing of such notice and on the motion of the state indicating its desire
to seek the death penalty, the court shall order that, within 48 hours
after the defendant is convicted of capital murder, the defendant be
examined by a mental health expert chosen by the, state. Attorneys for
the state and defendant may be present at the examination. The
examination shall be limited to those mitigating circumstances the
defendant expects to establish through expert testimony.
(d) Defendant's Refusal to Cooperate. If the defendant refuses to
be examined by or fully cooperate with the state's mental health expert,
the court may, in its discretion:
(1) order the defense to allow the state's expert to review all mental
health reports, tests, and evaluations by the defendant's mental health
expert; or
(2) prohibit defense mental health experts from testifying concerning
2
mental health tests, evaluations, or examinations of the defendant.
In issuing this proposed rule,3 the court rejected a proposal by the Criminal
Rules Committee to clarify that rule 3.220, which ostensibly governs all
discovery in criminal cases, applies to death penalty proceedings. 4 Do
provisions of rule 3.220 concerning depositions, reports of experts, and the
like nevertheless apply to capital sentencing? The court did not say, except

2. Amendments to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.220-Discovery (3.202-Expert
Testimony of Mental Mitigation During Penalty Phase of Capital Trial), 654 So. 2d 915, 91617 (Fla. 1995) [hereinafter Amendments].
3. The court directed the Criminal Procedure Rules Committee and other interested
parties to file comments by July 1, 1995. It also directed the Committee to consider
the need for 1) a rule requiring the defendant and the State to file a statement
of the issues to be tried in the penalty phase of a capital trial and 2) a pretrial
procedure, similar to summary judgment, that would allow the trial court to
determine whether the death penalty is an option based on the aggravating and
mitigating factors alleged to exist in a capital case.
Amendments, 654 So. 2d at 916. As to the first matter, the court has ruled in the past that
the state has no duty to disclose the aggravating circumstances it seeks to employ. E.g.,
Menendez v. State, 368 So. 2d 1278, 1282 n.21 (Fla. 1979). As to the second, the court has
ruled that it would violate the separation of powers doctrine of the state constitution for a
trial court to determine, before a trial, whether the state could seek the death penalty in the
event of a conviction. State v. Bloom, 497 So. 2d 2 (Fla. 1986).
4. Among other things, the Committee had proposed to amend rule 3.220 (a) to "make
the discovery rules applicable to the penalty phase of a capital trial." Amendments, 654 So.
2d at 915.
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to write in a footnote: "The proposed rule will not relieve the parties of the
continuing duty to disclose witnesses under Florida Rule of Criminal
Procedure 3.220(j)."'
Respecting discovery in postconviction proceedings, the court addressed
the question of whether a judge may be subjected to discovery depositions
in State v. Lewis. The court held that where a rule 3.850 motion for
postconviction relief alleges improper actions by the trial judge, there may
be limited discovery depositions of the judge where "absolutely necessary." 7
The court added that a judge has the power to limit his own deposition in
stating: "The judge may refuse to answer any question which the judge
deems intrusive."' In Asay v. FloridaParole Commission,9 the court held
that Brady v. Maryland,0 does not apply to clemency proceedings so that
clemency records need not be disclosed to death row inmates."
B.

Grand Jury

Discovery of grand jury testimony has also been a matter of controversy over the years. In Keen v. State, 2 the court seemed to have resolved
the matter, ruling that the trial court erred by refusing to grant at least in
camera review of grand jury testimony of a witness who had initially said
the death of Michael Keen's wife was an accident, but later said that he and
Mr. Keen had murdered her. Relying on Dennis v. United States," and
Miller v. Wainwright,'4 the court wrote that, upon a showing of particular-

5. Id. at 916 n.1. The Committee's proposal would have amended rule 3.220 to provide
for separate witness lists for the guilt and penalty phases. IL
6. 656 So. 2d 1248 (Fla. 1994).
7. Id. at 1250.

8. Il
9. 649 So. 2d 859 (Fla. 1994), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 591 (1995).
10. 373 U.S. 83 (1963). Under Brady, the prosecution must disclose exculpatory
evidence to the defense. Il at 86.
1I.In a related matter, the court amended Florida Bar Rule 4-1.6 (Confidentiality of
Information) by adding section (5)(e), which states: "Limitation of Amount of Disclosure.
When disclosure is mandated or permitted, the lawyer shall disclose no more information
than is required to meet the requirements or accomplish the purposes of this rule." The
Florida Bar re: Amendments to Rules Regulating the Florida Bar, 644 So. 2d 282, 311 (Fla.
1994). Presumably, this new rule was to govern disclosure of attorney-client communications
in litigation of ineffective assistance of counsel claims in capital cases.
12. 639 So. 2d 597 (Fla. 1994).
13. 384 U.S. 855 (1966).
14. 798 F.2d 426 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied andjudgment vacated by, 480 U.S. 901
(1987). The court also cited to Jent v. State, 408 So. 2d 1024 (Fla. 1986), cert. denied, 457
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ized need for access to grand jury 6testimony, 5 the trial court must turn
such testimony over to the defense.
During the survey period, the court rejected a claim under Keen in
Armstrong v. State, 7 ruling that the trial court did not err in denying in
camera review of grand jury testimony where the defense failed to show its
materiality and failed to advise the court as to its possible usefulness.

II. THE PENALTY TRIAL
A.

The Jury Sentencing Trial

In State v. Hernandez,8 the court resolved a nagging question
regarding the procedure for waiving the right to a jury sentencing proceeding. In State v. Ferguson,9 the district court had held that under rule
3.260 of the FloridaRules of CriminalProcedure,the defendant could not
waive the sentencing jury without the state's consent.2" Hernandez
overruled Ferguson, and held that the trial court has discretion to proceed
to sentencing without a jury upon a knowing and intelligent waiver by the
defendant." It noted, however, that under Sireci v. State,2 the "trial
judge may require a jury recommendation notwithstanding the defendant's
waiver."' 3
B.

Evidence and Argument
1. Hearsay

Section 921.141(1) of the Florida Statutes provides the following
regarding evidence at death penalty sentencing proceedings:

U.S. 1111 (1982), without noting that Miller effectively overruled Jent. For the history of
this issue, see Gary Caldwell, Recent Florida Capital Decisions, 16 NOVA L. REv. 1357,
1362-64 (1992).
15. Under Miller, the defense shows a particularized need by demonstrating inconsistencies between the deposition and trial testimony of a material witness. Miller, 798 F.2d at
429.
16. Keen, 639 So. 2d at 600 & n.4.
17. 642 So. 2d 730 (Fla. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 1799 (1995).

18. 645 So. 2d 432 (Fla. 1994).
19. 556 So. 2d 462 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.), review denied,564 So. 2d 1085 (Fla. .1990).

20. Id.
at 464.
21. Hernandez, 645 So. 2d at 435.
22. 587 So. 2d 450 (Fla. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 946 (1992).
23. Hernandez, 645 So. 2d at 435.
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In the proceeding, evidence may be presented as to any matter that the
court deems relevant to the nature of the crime and the character of the
defendant and shall include matters relating to any of the aggravating
or mitigating circumstances enumerated in subsections (5) and (6). Any
such evidence which the court deems to have probative value may be
received, regardless of its admissibility under the exclusionary rules of
evidence, provided the defendant is accorded a fair opportunity to rebut
any hearsay statements. 24

Somewhat surprisingly, the supreme court's decisions have interpreted the
statute to authorize the state's use of hearsay and to prevent the defense's
use of it.
As to the state's use of hearsay, the main case is Rhodes v. State,25 in
which the State presented the capital sentencing jury with evidence about an
offense committed by the defendant in Nevada. A police captain played a
taped interview of the Nevada victim, and gave hearsay testimony about the
statement. The supreme court ruled that the Confrontation Clause barred the
State's use of the taped statement,26 but then ruled that the State could use
the captain's hearsay testimony regarding the victim's statement, concluding

24. FLA. STAT. § 921.141(1) (1995).

25. 547 So. 2d 1201 (Fla. 1989).
26. Id. at 1204.
While hearsay evidence may be admissible in penalty phase proceedings, such
evidence is admissible only if the defendant is accorded a fair opportunity to
rebut any hearsay statements. The statements made by the Nevada victim came
from a tape recording, not from a witness present in the courtroom. In Engle
v. State, we stated:
The [S]ixth [A]mendment right of an accused to confront the
witnesses against him is a fundamental right which is made
obligatory on the states by the [Due Process Clause] of the [F]ourteenth [A]mendment to the United States Constitution. The primary
interest secured by, and the major reason underlying the [C]onfrontation [C]lause, is the right of cross-examination. This right of
confrontation protected by cross-examination is a right that has been
applied to the sentencing process.
Obviously, Rhodes did not have the opportunity to confront and cross-examine
this witness. By allowing the jury to hear the taped statement of the Nevada
victim describing how the defendant tried to cut her throat with a knife and the
emotional trauma suffered because of it, the trial court effectively denied Rhodes
this fundamental right of confronting and cross-examining a witness against him.
Under these circumstances if Rhodes wished to deny or explain this testimony,
he was left with no choice but to take the witness stand himself.
Id. (citations omitted).
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that because the defendant could cross-examine the captain, his hearsay
testimony was admissible.2 7
At to the defense's use of hearsay, the court wrote in Hitchcock v.
28
State:
Hitchcock argues that, although the state's introducing hearsay in a
penalty proceeding is limited to that hearsay which a defendant is given
the opportunity to rebut, a defendant's ability to introduce hearsay is
unlimited. While the rules of evidence have been relaxed somewhat for
penalty proceedings, they have not been rescinded. We find no merit
to Hitchcock's claim that the state must abide by the rules but that
defendants need not do so. Additionally, even if admissible, the hearsay
statements would have been merely cumulative to other testimony about
Hitchcock's past.29
During the survey period, the court expressed some antipathy for
defense hearsay evidence in Griffin v. State0 and Wuornos v. State.3 In
Griffin, relying on Hitchcock, the court approved the trial court's refusal to
let the defense present evidence of the defendant's remorse and character.32
In Wuornos, without totally disapproving the defense's use of hearsay, the
court ruled that the trial court did not err in failing to find in mitigation facts
presented via hearsay: "The vast bulk of the case for mitigation was
hearsay. While hearsay can be admissible in the penalty phase, we cannot
conceive that there is any absolute duty for the trial court to accept it in
mitigation where, as here, the State's rebuttal established strong indicia of
unreliability."3 3
In Henry v. State,34 the court found no error in the State's presentation
of hearsay in the form of a transcript of the testimony of a witness at the
trial leading to Henry's conviction of a prior violent felony.

27. Il
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

578 So. 2d 685 (Fla. 1990), judgment vacated, 505 U.S. 1215 (1992).
Id. at 690 (footnote omitted).
639 So. 2d 966 (Fla. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1317 (1995).
644 So. 2d 1012 (Fla. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1708 (1995).
Griffin, 639 So. 2d at 970.
Wuornos, 644 So. 2d at 1020.
649 So. 2d 1366 (Fla. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2591 (1995).
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2. Treatment of Mitigation
In three cases, the court seemed to express three different views about
in mitigation. In Walls v. State,35 Justice
opinion evidence presented
36
court:
the
Kogan wrote for
Eighth, Walls contends that the trial court improperly rejected
expert opinion testimony that he was suffering extreme emotional disturbance and that his capacity to conform his conduct to the law's
requirements was substantially impaired. In Florida as in many states,
a distinction exists between factual evidence or testimony, and opinion
testimony. As a general rule, uncontroverted factual evidence cannot
simply be rejected unless it is contrary to law, improbable, untrustworthy, unreasonable, or contradictory. This rule applies equally to the
penalty phase of a capital trial.
Opinion testimony, on the other hand, is not subject to the same
rule. Certain kinds of opinion testimony clearly are admissible-and
especially qualified expert opinion testimony-but they are not
necessarily binding even if uncontroverted. Opinion testimony gains its
greatest force to the degree it is supported by the facts at hand, and its
weight diminishes to the degree such support is lacking. A debatable
link between fact and opinion relevant to a mitigating factor usually
means, at most, that a question exists for judge and jury to resolve. We

cannot conclude that the evidence here was anything more than
debatable. Accordingly, this Court may not revisit the judge and jury's

determination on appeal.37

In a footnote to the opinion the court stated:
Reasonable persons could conclude that the facts of the murder are
inconsistent with the presence of the two mental mitigators. Moreover,
all the experts hedged their statements, gave equivocal responses, or
responded to questions that themselves were equivocal. The psychiatrist
said he could not testify as to Walls' state of mind at the time of the
murder. One psychologist responded yes to a question that essentially
only asked whether Walls was suffering any impairment at the time of
the murder. The facts may be consistent with some degree of emotional
impairment, which the trial court surely recognized in finding emotional

35. 641 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 943 (1995).
36. Chief Justice Grimes, and Justices Overton, Shaw, and Harding concurred in the
court's opinion. Id. at 391. Justice McDonald wrote a special concurrence joined by Justice
Overton. Id.
37. 1&. at 390-91 (citations omitted) (footnote omitted).

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol20/iss3/15

8

Caldwell: Florida Capital Cases: July 1, 1994 - July 30, 1995

19961

Caldwell

1263

handicap and brain dysfunction as nonstatutory mitigators. Nevertheless, the expert testimony does not address the true problem here: the
relative weight of mitigating versus aggravating circumstances. On the
whole, the facts are consistent with the conclusion that any impairment
Walls suffered was nonstatutory in nature and, in any event, was of far
slighter weight than the aggravating factors found to exist.38
Thus, Walls indicates that the sentencer is free to disregard unrebutted
expert evidence offered in mitigation. In Spencer v. State,39 however, the
court took an opposite view:
We also find merit in Spencer's claim that the trial court improperly rejected the statutory mitigating circumstances. During the penalty
phase, the two experts testified that Spencer suffered from chronic
alcohol and substance abuse, a paranoid personality disorder, and
biochemical intoxication. Based upon their testing, interviews, and
evaluations, both experts concluded that Spencer was under the
influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance at the time the
murder was committed and that his capacity to conform his conduct to
the requirements of law was impaired. The sentencing order finds that
neither of these mitigating factors is present.
Whenever a reasonable quantum of competent, uncontroverted
evidence of mitigation has been presented, the trial court must find that
the mitigating circumstance has been proved. A trial court may reject
a defendant's claim that a mitigating circumstance has been proved if
the record contains competent substantial evidence to support the trial
court's rejection of the mitigating circumstance. In this case, the
evidence of these mitigating circumstances that was submitted by
Spencer was uncontroverted. The trial judge rejected the experts'
opinions as speculative and conclusory. However, the experts based
their opinions on a battery of psychological and personality tests
administered to Spencer, clinical interviews with Spencer, examination
of evidence in this case, and a review of Spencer's life history, school
records, and military records. Thus, the trial court erred in not finding
and weighing these statutory mental mitigating circumstances. 4°

38. Il at 391 n.8.
39. 645 So. 2d 377 (Fla. 1994).
40. Md. at 384-85 (citations omitted).
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The voting pattern in Spencer is worth noting. Justices Shaw, Harding,
and McDonald joined the per curiam opinion for the court, 4 and Justice
Kogan concurred in part and dissented in part, writing:
In light of the strong case for mental mitigation here and the lack
cold
calculated premeditation, I would reduce the penalty to life
of
imprisonment without possibility of parole for twenty-five years. A
remand here would be a useless act because the death penalty cannot be
imposed based on the facts. I note that this case is directly on point
with Santos v. State, in which we remanded based on similar facts only
to reverse the trial court's imposition of the death penalty in the appeal
after remand. Moreover, based on our second Santos opinion, I believe
death clearly cannot be proportional in this instance. I therefore dissent
as to the remand, but otherwise concur with the majority.42
Justice Kogan made no mention of the apparent contradiction between these
views and his opinion for the court in Walls.
In Jones v. State,43 the court approved the trial judge's refusal to find
in mitigation apparently uncontroverted evidence that the defendant's
alcoholic mother had abandoned him as a child:
As a separate nonstatutory mitigating circumstance the trial judge
considered the fact that Jones was "an abandoned child who was raised
by relatives." The court rejected this "childhood scenario" as a mitigating factor, reasoning that Jones' mother delivered him into an "infinitely
superior environment" where he was cared for by "decent, law abiding
and God fearing" relatives who "cared for him as if he was one of their
own" and where he did well in school and was a good child.
Jones challenges the trial judge's failure to find his abandonment
by an alcoholic mother in mitigation and maintains that a new sentencing proceeding is required because the mental health experts who
testified did not bring to the court's attention the fact that Jones likely
suffers from fetal alcohol syndrome. First, on this record, the court did
not abuse its discretion by refusing to find in mitigation that Jones was
abandoned by an alcoholic mother."

41. Id. at 385.
42. IU. at 386 (citations omitted).

43. 652 So. 2d 346 (Fla.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 202 (1995).
44. Id.at 351 (citations omitted).
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3. "Victim Impact" Evidence
In Windom v. State,4 5 the court addressed a number of issues pertaining to the State's use of "victim impact" evidence:
Windom attacks the admissibility of testimony by a police officer
during the sentencing phase of the trial. The police officer was
assigned by her police department to teach an anti-drug program in an
elementary school in the community in which the defendant and the
three victims of the murders lived, and where the murders occurred.
Two of the sons of one of the victims were students in the program.
The police officer testified concerning her observation about one of
these sons following the murder. Her testimony involved a discussion
concerning an essay which the child wrote. She quoted the essay from
memory: "Some terrible things happened in my family this year because of drugs. If it hadn't been for DARE, I would have killed
myself." The police officer also described the effect of the shootings
on the other children in the elementary school. She testified that a lot
of the children were afraid.
Defendant asserts, first, that this evidence was in essence nonstatutory aggravation, relying upon Grossman v. State. Defendant does
concede that subsequent to Payne v. Tennessee this Court has held
victim impact testimony to be admissible as long as it comes within the
parameters of the Payne decision. Both the Florida Constitution in
Article I, Section 16, and the Florida Legislature in section 921.141(7),
Florida Statutes (1993), instruct that in our state, victim impact evidence
is to be heard in considering capital felony sentences. We do not
believe that the procedure for addressing victim impact evidence, as set
forth in the statute, impermissibly affects the weighing of the aggravators and mitigators which we approved in State v. Dixon, or otherwise
interferes with the constitutional rights of the defendant. Therefore, we
reject the argument which classifies victim impact evidence as a
nonstatutory aggravator in an attempt to exclude it during the sentencing
phase of a capital case.
Rather, we believe that section 921.141(7) indicates clearly that
victim impact evidence is admitted only after there is present in the
record evidence of one or more aggravating circumstances. The
evidence is not admitted as an aggravator but, instead, as set forth in
section 921.141(7), allows the jury to consider "the victim's uniqueness
as an individual human being and the resultant loss to the community's
members by the victim's death." Victim impact evidence must be
limited to that which is relevant as specified in section 921.141(7). The
45. 656 So. 2d 432 (Fla.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 571 (1995).
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testimony in which the police officer testified about the effect on
children in the community other than the victim's two sons was
erroneously admitted because it was not limited to the victim's
uniqueness and the loss to the community's members by the victim's
death.
However, defendant did not object to this testimony specifically,
and thus his objection on appeal is procedurally barred ....
Defendant's second attack on the victim impact evidence concerns
the application of 921.141(7) to defendant's crime. He claims that such
application was a violation of the ex post facto clauses of the United
States and Florida Constitutions since the murders were on February 7,
1992, and subsection seven of section 921.141 did not go into effect
until July 1, 1992. We do not agree. To the contrary, we approve the
Fourth District Court of Appeal's decision on this point in State v.
Maxwell, in which the district court found our decision in Glendening
v. State to be instructive. Section 921.141(7) only relates to the
admission of evidence and is thus procedural. Therefore, application of
section 921.141(7) in the present case does not violate the prohibition
against ex post facto laws.'

4. Final Argument
In Wike v. State,47 the court found per se reversible error in the trial
court's failure to allow the defense to make its final argument to the
sentencing jury under rule 3.780 of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure.
III. AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES

A. Sentence of Imprisonment's
Although the application of this circumstance is usually straightforward,
Thompson v. State,4 9 involved a rare misapplication. At the time that the
defendant murdered a sandwich shop employee, he was ostensibly serving
community control sentences for various thefts and forgeries. Accordingly,
the trial court employed the "sentence of imprisonment" circumstance in

46. l at 438-39 (citations omitted).
47. 648 So. 2d 683, 687 (Fla. 1994).
48. An aggravating circumstance exists where "[t]he capital felony was committed by
a person under sentence of imprisonment or placed on community control." FLA. STAT. §
921.141(5)(a).
49. 647 So. 2d 824 (Fla. 1994).
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sentencing him to death for the murder. After imposition of the death sentence, the court presiding over the community control cases ruled that the
community control sentences had been illegally imposed. Accordingly, the
defendant argued on appeal that it was error to use the "sentence of
imprisonment" circumstance against him. The supreme court agreed:
"We have expressly held that a conviction used as an aggravating
circumstance, which is valid at the time of the sentence but later
reversed and vacated by an appellate court, results in an error in the
penalty phase proceeding. The reversal eliminates the proper use of the
conviction as an aggravating factor." We conclude that the same
reasoning applies to an aggravating circumstance based on an illegal
sentence. We strike this aggravating circumstance."0

B. Previous Violent Felony Conviction"
Again, there is usually little trouble with the application of this
circumstance. 2 There were no significant developments regarding this
circumstance during the survey period.

50. IL at 827 (citations omitted).
51. An aggravating circumstance exists where "[t]he defendant was previously convicted
of another capital felony or of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person."
FLA. STAT. § 921.141(5)(b).
52. A defendant has been "previously convicted" even if the violent felony is
contemporaneous with the murder. See Lucas v. State, 376 So. 2d 1149 (Fla. 1979)
(attempted murders of two victims could constitute prior violent felonies in sentencing
defendant for murder of third victim). On the other hand, contemporaneous violent felonies
committed on the murder victim do not satisfy the circumstance. See Holton v. State, 573
So. 2d 284 (Fla.), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 960 (1991). The court has written directly contrary
opinions as to whether the circumstance applies only to felonies which contain a violent
element or whether the court can look to the facts to determine whether the previous felony
involved violence. Compare Elam v. State, 636 So. 2d 1312, 1314 (Fla. 1994) (holding it
error to use conviction for solicitation to commit murder to establish the circumstance since
violence is not an inherent element of this offense) with Sweet v. State, 624 So. 2d 1138
(Fla. 1993) (approving the trial court's use of conviction for possession of firearm by
convicted felon, notwithstanding that violence is not an inherent element of that offense;
sentencer not bound by the elements of the offense, and can look to facts underlying prior
offense), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1206 (1994).
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C. Great Risk53
In Coney v. State,5" the court disapproved use of this circumstance in
an arson-murder at a jail, in which "Jimmie Coney set his putative jailhouse
lover ablaze."55 Striking the circumstance, the court wrote: "the fire was
relatively small, was contained within a single cell, was set in an area under
constant surveillance,
and was easily extinguished with several puffs from
56
a fire extinguisher.,

D. Felony Murder

7

There were no significant developments respecting this circumstance.

E.

The Law Enforcement Circumstances: Avoiding Arrest,
Hindering Law Enforcement, and Murder of Law Enforcement
Officers 8

Where the defendant has murdered a police officer, the application of
these aggravating circumstances is nearly automatic, although they usually
merge into one.59
Problems arise, however, when the victim is not a law enforcement
officer. Robertson v. State' sets out the standards applying to such cases:

53. An aggravating circumstance also exists where "[t]he defendant knowingly created
a great risk of death to many persons." FLA. STAT. § 921.141(5)(c).
54. 653 So. 2d 1009 (Fla.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 315 (1995).

55. Id. at 1010.
56. Id. at 1015.
57. "The capital felony was committed while the defendant was engaged, or was an
accomplice, in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after committing or
attempting to commit, any robbery, sexual battery, aggravated child abuse, arson, burglary,
kidnapping, or aircraft piracy or the unlawful throwing, placing, or discharging of a
destructive device or bomb." FLA. STAT. § 921.141(5)(d).
58. In addition, an aggravating circumstance exists when "[tlhe capital felony was
committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest or effecting an escape
from custody," id. § 921.141(5)(e); "[t]he capital felony was committed to disrupt or hinder
the lawful exercise of any governmental function or the enforcement of laws," id. §
921.141(5)(g); "[t]he victim of the capital felony was a law enforcement officer engaged in
the performance of his official duties," id. § 921.141(5)0).
59. E.g., Pietri v. State, 644 So. 2d 1347 (Fla. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2588
(1995); Armstrong v. State, 642 So. 2d 730 (Fla. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1799 (1995).
60. 611 So. 2d 1228 (Fla. 1993) (striking circumstance where defendant murdered a
woman who had witnessed her companion's murder).
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The State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that an aggravating
circumstance exists. Moreover, even the trial court may not draw
"logical inferences" to support a finding of a particular aggravating
circumstance when the State has not met its burden. In order to support
a finding that a defendant committed a murder to avoid arrest, the State
must show beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's dominant or
only motive for the murder of the victim, who is not a law enforcement
officer, is the elimination of a witness. "Proof of the requisite intent to
avoid arrest and detection must be very strong" to support this aggravating circumstance when the victim is not a law enforcement officer.6'
Thus, in the past, the court has struck the circumstance where
defendants committing burglaries have murdered victims who knew and
could identify them.62 On the other hand, it has applied the circumstance
where the defendant has moved a victim to a remote location.63
The court followed the first line of cases in disapproving the circumstance in Thompson v. State.6'4 The evidence there was that the defendant
robbed and shot the attendant of a Subway sandwich shop. The court struck
the circumstance because "we do not know what happened" at the time of
the shooting.65
It followed the second line in approving the circumstance in other
cases. In Thompson v. State,66 a retarded former grave digger, thinking
that the cemetery owed him money, forced the bookkeeper to write him a
check, then took the bookkeeper and his assistant to a wooded area and
murdered them. Finding that the record supported the circumstance, the
court wrote: "Once Thompson had obtained the $1,500 check from Swack
and Walker, there was little reason to kill them other than to eliminate the

61. Id. at 1232 (citations omitted).
62. E.g., Davis v. State, 604 So. 2d 794 (Fla. 1992) (burglar killed elderly woman who
knew and could identify him; supreme court held that the fact that witness elimination may
have been a motive in the murder was insufficient to support circumstance); Geralds v. State,
601 So. 2d 1157, 1164 (Fla. 1992) (striking circumstance and speculating that where burglar
tied victim up and then killed her, perhaps defendant killed her while she was trying to
escape).
63. E.g., Hall v. State, 614 So. 2d 473, 477 (Fla.) (holding circumstance applied where
defendants abducted and raped woman, killing her to cover up their crime), cert. denied, 114
S. Ct. 109 (1993).
64. 647 So. 2d 824 (Fla. 1994).
65. Id. at 827. See the discussion of the court's striking of the coldness circumstance
below. See infra part III.H.
66. 648 So. 2d 692 (Fla. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 2283 (1995).
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sole witnesses to his actions." 67 The court apparently did not consider the
defendant's slim intellectual resources in reaching this determination.
The court affirmed the circumstance without discussion in Suggs v.
State where Ernest Suggs took a barmaid to a remote area and stabbed
her,6" and in Fennie v. State where Alfred L. Fennie flagged down a
woman motorist, forced her into the trunk of her car, eventually shooting her
after driving around telling others he was going to kill her.69
F.

70

Pecuniary Gain

This circumstance usually applies in robbery and burglary eases where
it merges with the felony murder circumstance.7 1 Problems may arise
when the state's theory is that the defendant has committed a murder to
obtain insurance proceeds. In Chaky v. State,72 pointing to the fact that
Kenneth Chaky had increased life insurance coverage of his wife less than
seven months before he murdered her, the trial court concluded that he had
committed the murder for pecuniary gain. 3 The supreme court disagreed:
In his third issue, Chaky contends that the evidence is insufficient
to support, beyond a reasonable doubt, the aggravating circumstance of
"committed the murder for pecuniary gain." This aggravating circumstance applies "only where the murder is an integral step in obtaining
some sought-after specific gain." Moreover, proof of this aggravating
circumstance cannot be supplied by inference from circumstances unless
the evidence is inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis other than
the existence of the aggravating circumstance. The only evidence
presented to support this aggravating circumstance was that Chaky, as
a matter of course through his employment with the University of
Florida, maintained two life insurance policies on his wife, totalling

67. Id. at 695. The court employed somewhat similar reasoning in Hannon v. State, 638
So. 2d 39 (Fla. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1118 (1995). There, the defendant and two
friends murdered a man who had mistreated the sister of one of the friends. The defendant
then chased the first victim's roommate upstairs and murdered him. The court upheld the
avoid arrest circumstance because the roommate's murder was "ancillary" to the purpose of
killing the first man. Id. at 44.
68. 644 So. 2d 64, 70 (Fla. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1794 (1995).
69. 648 So. 2d 95, 98 (Fla. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1120 (1995).
70. An aggravating circumstance exists if "[t]he capital felony was committed for
pecuniary gain." FLA. STAT. § 921.141(5)(0.
71. E.g., Robertson v. State, 611 So. 2d 1228 (Fla. 1993).
72. 651 So. 2d 1169 (Fla. 1995).
73. Id. at 1171.
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$185,000, and that he had increased this life insurance on a regular
basis since his initial employment date with the university in 1985.
Additional testimony indicated that fifty-percent of all employees with
the university maintained similar policies and that the amount of
insurance Chaky maintained on his wife was only half of the amount of
life insurance he maintained on himself. Further, the last increase in his
life insurance was initiated more than six months before he killed his
wife. Although Chaky did tell Thompson and Feinberg that he would
pay them for their assistance, Thompson assumed that he was to be paid
from automobile insurance money obtained for burning Chaky's car and
Feinberg was never told where the funds for payment would come from
and was not told that he would be paid until after the murder occurred.
Although one could surmise under these circumstances that Chaky killed
his wife to obtain the insurance proceeds, we must conclude that the
evidence in this record is insufficient to support that hypothesis beyond
a reasonable doubt. Consequently, we find that the trial judge erroneously concluded that Chaky committed the murder for pecuniary
gain.74

G. Heinousness75
During the survey period, the court did little to firm up this often
shapeless circumstance.7 6 In 1995, after many years of litigation, the court

adopted the following jury instruction defining the circumstance:
8. The crime for which the defendant is to be sentenced was
especially wieked, evi4, heinous, atrocious, or cruel. "Heinous" means
extremely wicked or shockingly evil. "Atrocious" means outrageously
wicked and vile. "Cruel" means designed to inflict a high degree of
pain with utter indifference to, or even enjoyment of, the suffering of
others. The kind of crime intended to be included as heinous, atrocious,
or cruel is one accompanied by additional acts that show that the crime

74. Id. at 1172-73 (citations omitted).
75. An aggravating circumstance exists if "[tihe capital felony was especially heinous,
atrocious, or cruel." FLA. STAT. § 921.141(5)(h).
76. For the background of this circumstance, see Craig S. Barnard, Death Penalty (1988
Survey of Florida Law), 13 NOVA L. REV. 908 (1989); Eric Cumfer, Instructing a Capital
Sentencing Jury on Florida's Especially Heinous, Atrocious, or Cruel Aggravating
Circumstance, 14 FLA. B. CRIM. L. SEC. NEWSL., Oct. 1991, at 18; Michael Mello, Florida's
"Heinous, Atrocious, or Cruel" Aggravating Circumstance: Narrowing the Classof DeathEligible Cases Without Making It Smaller, 13 STETSON L. REv. 523 (1984); Richard A.
Rosen, The "Especially Heinous" Aggravating Circumstance in Capital Cases-The
Standardless Standard, 64 N.C. L. REv. 941 (1986).
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was conscienceless or pitiless and was unnecessarily torturous to the
77
victim.
This instruction is an amalgam of definitions of "heinous," "atrocious," and
"cruel" found unconstitutional in Shell v. Mississippi,78 and a narrowing
construction ("accompanied by additional acts... unnecessarily torturous
79
to the victim") found constitutional in Proffitt v. Florida.
Notwithstanding this attempt at regularizing the circumstance's
application, the court still seems to reach contrary results in similar cases.
In Green v. State,8° the court disapproved the circumstance where, robbing
Charles Flynn and Kim Hallock at gun point in the woods, Crosley Green
tied Flynn's hands behind his back, and kidnapped the pair.8" Attempting
to escape, Flynn shot at Green8" who shot him back as Hallock escaped.
The court wrote: "The additional acts accompanying Flynn's death-Flynn
knew Green had a gun, his hands were tied behind his back, and he was
driven a short distance to the orange grove-do not turn this shooting death
into the "'especially' heinous" type of crime for which this aggravator is
reserved.83
The court took a different tack in Wuornos v. State84 writing:
Next, Wuornos contends that this murder was not heinous,
atrocious, or cruel beyond a reasonable doubt. Wuornos' initial
confession to law officers detailed a sequence in which she first
struggled with Mallory for no reason other than his refusal to remove
his clothes. After winning the struggle, she pointed the gun at him and
announced that she "knew" he was going to rape her. Despite
Mallory's protestation that he had no intent to rape her, she shot him
anyway. Mallory still was conscious and able to walk from the car. In
spite of seeing this, Wuoros then ran around to where Mallory was
standing, and shot him several more times.
We believe the protracted nature of this killing together with the
mental suffering it necessarily would entail created a question for the
finder of fact to resolve, especially in light of the similar crimes

77. In Re Standard Jury Instructions Criminal Cases - No. 90-1, 579 So. 2d 75, 75 (Fla.
1990).
78. 498 U.S. 1 (1990).
79. 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
80. 641 So. 2d 391 (Fla. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1120 (1995).

81.
82.
83.
84.

Id. at 395-96.
Apparently Flynn's hands were still tied behind his back. Id at 393.
IdM at 396; see Tedder v. State, 322 So. 2d 908, 910 (Fla. 1975).
644 So. 2d 1000 (Fla. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1705 (1995).
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evidence. That question has been resolved against Wuornos, and the
resolution is sufficiently supported by the record.85
Similarly, the court wrote in the case of Charlie Thompson:
We also find that there was sufficient evidence to support the trial
court's finding that each murder was heinous, atrocious, or cruel.
Swack was stabbed numerous times before he was shot. Also, both
victims undoubtedly suffered great fear and terror for some time prior
to their murders. In the sentencing order, the trial judge stated:
After obtaining a check to which he was not entitled, the
Defendant forced the victims to go in one of the victim's cars
to a park and then walk to a secluded wooded area. The
Defendant was armed with a knife and a gun. The victims
were forced to disrobe. The female victim was then allowed
to redress. While clothed only in his underwear and shoes
and socks, the male victim struggled with the Defendant and
was stabbed nine times in various parts of his body. While
the victim was still alive, the Defendant shot him in the head.
The female victim was lying face down on the ground with
her head on her arm. The autopsy revealed a bite mark to her
arm that was inflicted while she was alive and aware of her
impending death which came from a gunshot to her head. It
is unclear which victim was killed first, but it is clear that
both were aware for some period of time that the Defendant
intended to kill them.
We have previously found that these type of facts support a finding of
the heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravating factor. 6

Wyatt v. State 7 is consistent with Thompson.

Robbing a pizza
restaurant, Thomas Wyatt raped an employee, and then shot her and two co-

85. Id at 1011 (citation omitted). The court also upheld use of the circumstance for
another murder committed by Aileen Wuomos in a separate case where the victim "suffered
bruises and abrasions and was shot while in the act of twisting or writhing in a vain effort
to avoid his attacker." Wuomos v. State, 644 So. 2d 1012, 1019 (Fla. 1994), cert. denied,
115 S. Ct. 1708 (1995).
86. Thompson v. State, 648 So. 2d 692, 695-96 (Fla.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2283
(1995) (citations omitted).
87. 641 So. 2d 1336 (Fla. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1983 (1995).
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workers (one of them her husband). The court upheld the circumstance
because the victims "were acutely aware of their impending deaths."88
The court also upheld the circumstance in Whitton v. State,89 where
the defendant beat and stabbed a drunken friend stealing his money. The
court rejected an argument that since the decedent had a blood alcohol level
of .34, it was unlikely that he experienced the degree of pain or suffering
associated with the heinousness circumstance. 90
State v. Breedlove involved an unusual interpretation of the circumstance. The trial court had granted a motion to vacate McArthur Breedlove's death sentence for a 1979 murder92 because the sentencing jury had
received an unconstitutional jury instruction on the heinousness circumstance. 93 The supreme court reversed, writing that the use of the unconstitutional instruction was harmless.94 Without purporting to employ the
narrowing construction contained in the 1991 jury instruction, the court
employed an amorphous standard that the murder was "far different from the
norm of capital felonies[:]"
However, we believe that the failure to give the requested
instruction on heinous, atrocious, or cruel was harmless error. The
evidence presented at the trial clearly established that Breedlove
committed the murder in a heinous, atrocious, or cruel manner. The
fatal stabbing was administered with such force that it broke the
victim's collar bone and drove the knife all the way through to the
shoulder blade. The puncture of the victim's lung was associated with
great pain and the victim literally drowned in his own blood. The
victim had defensive stab wounds on his hands and did not die
immediately. Moreover, the attack occurred while the victim lay asleep

88. Il at 1341. In another case, Wyatt took a woman from a bar across the state and
then shot her and stole her car. Wyatt v. State, 641 So. 2d 355 (Fla. 1994), cert. denied, 115

S. Ct. 1372 (1995). The trial court instructed the jury on the heinousness circumstance, but
did not find it in the sentencing order. The supreme court ruled that it did not need to decide
whether the evidence supported the circumstance "because the jury was properly instructed
and the trial judge did not find the existence of this aggravating circumstance." Id. at 360.
89. 649 So. 2d 861 (Fla. 1994), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 106 (1995).
90. 1&at 866-67.
91. 655 So. 2d 74 (Fla.), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 678 (1995).
92. The supreme court had affirmed the conviction and death sentence in Breedlove v.
State, 413 So. 2d 1 (Fla.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 882 (1982).
93. See Espinosa v. Florida, 505 U.S. 1245 (1992) (holding that heinousness jury
instruction violated eighth amendment requirement of narrow definition of aggravating
circumstances), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2184 (1994).
94. Breedlove, 655 So. 2d at 76.
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in his bed as contrasted to a murder committed in a public place. In
fact, in discussing this aggravator in Breedlove's direct appeal, we
stated that this killing was "far different from the norm of capital
felonies" and set apart from other murders. Under the facts presented,
this aggravator clearly existed and would have been found even if the
requested instruction had been given. Further, there were two other
valid aggravating circumstances, including the previous conviction of a
violent felony. While Breedlove presented some testimony concerning
possible psychological problems, two state experts expressly stated that
they found no evidence of organic brain damage or psychosis and one
of them said Breedlove was malingering. Any error in the instruction
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and did not affect Breedlove's
sentence. 95
Apparently in response to a dissent by Justice Anstead (joined by Justices
Shaw and Kogan) based on James v. State,96 the court wrote: "Breedlove's

95. lldat 76-77 (citations omitted).
96. 615 So. 2d 668 (Fla. 1993). James has an interesting history. In 1981, Davidson
and Larry Clark robbed a sign shop owned by Felix and Dorothy Satey. Clark shot Mr.
Satey twice, and the men then went into an adjoining residence where one of them shot
the seventy-four-year-old Mrs. Satey who was confined by a physical disability
to a castored typist's chair. Mr. Satey pleaded that his wife not be harmed, then
heard a gunshot followed by his wife's moaning. When found, Mrs. Satey had
a gunshot wound over the right eye, from which she subsequently died.
Clark v. State, 443 So. 2d 973, 975 (Fla. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1210 (1984). On
Clark's appeal, the court struck the heinousness circumstance, writing:
Directing a pistol shot to the head of the victim does not establish a homicide
as especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. Although Mr. Satey testified that he
heard his wife moan after being shot, there was no evidence of whether she was
conscious after being shot, not [sic] did the medical examiner indicate how long
Mrs. Satey survived or what degree of pain, if any, she suffered. Although the
helpless anticipation of impending death may serve as the basis for this
aggravating factor, there is no evidence to prove that Mrs. Satey knew for more
than an instant before she was shot what was about to happen to her. Similarly,
as pitiable as were Mr. Satey's vain efforts to dissuade his attackers from
harming his wife, it is the effect upon the victim herself that must be considered
in determining the existence of this aggravating factor.
Id. at 977 (citations omitted). Relying on Clark, the court then struck the circumstance in
James's appeal. See James v. State, 453 So. 2d 786 (Fla.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1098
(1984). In both cases, however, the court found harmless the trial court's use of the
heinousness circumstance.
In 1993, the court accepted James' argument that the unconstitutional instruction on
the circumstance required resentencing:
In closing argument the state attorney argued forcefully that the murder
was heinous, atrocious, or cruel. On appeal, on the other hand, we held that the
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reliance on James v. State, is misplaced because in that case it was
determined
that the facts did not support a finding of heinous, atrocious, or
97
cruel.

H. Coldness9 8
As in the past,99 the coldness circumstance was the most frequently
misapplied during the survey period.' °

facts did not support finding that aggravator. Striking that aggravator left four
valid ones to be weighed against no mitigators, and we believe that the trial
court's consideration of the invalid aggravator was harmless error. We cannot
say beyond a reasonable doubt, however, that the invalid instruction did not
affect the jury's consideration or that its recommendation would have been the
same if the requested expanded instruction had been given. Therefore, we
reverse the trial court's order as to the last issue regarding the constitutionality
of the instruction on the heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravator. The trial court
is directed to empanel a new jury, to hold a new sentencing proceeding, and to
resentence James.
James, 615 So. 2d at 669 (citation omitted).
97. Breedlove, 655 So. 2d at 77 n.4.
98. An aggravating circumstance exists where "[t]he capital felony was a homicide and
was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral
or legal justification." FLA. STAT. § 921.141(5)(i). For the early history of this circumstance, see Jonathan Kennedy, Florida's "Cold, Calculated and Premeditated"Aggravating
Circumstance in Death Penalty Cases, 17 STETSON L. REV. 47 (1987).
99. See Gary Caldwell, CapitalCrimes (1993 Survey of FloridaLaw), 18 NOVA L. REV.
117, 128 (1993).
100. The court approved use of the circumstance in twelve direct appeals. See Hunter
v. State, 660 So. 2d 244 (Fla. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 946 (1996); Gamble v. State,
659 So. 2d 242 (Fla. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 933 (1996); Windom v. State, 656 So.
2d 432 (Fla.), cert denied, 116 S. Ct. 571 (1995); Lockhart v. State, 655 So. 2d 69 (Fla.),
cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 250 (1995); Foster v. State, 654 So. 2d 112 (Fla.), cert. denied, 116
S. Ct. 314 (1995); Thompson v. State, 648 So. 2d 692 (Fla. 1994); Fennie v. State, 648 So.
2d 95 (Fla. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1120 (1995); Wuornos v. State, 644 So. 2d 1012
(Fla. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1708 (1995); Wuomos v. State, 644 So. 2d 1000 (Fla.
1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1705 (1995); Suggs v. State, 644 So. 2d 64 (Fla. 1994), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 1794 (1995); Walls v. State, 641 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 1994), cert. denied, 115
S. Ct. 943 (1995); Griffin v. State, 639 So. 2d 966 (Fla. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1317
(1995). The court disapproved use of the circumstance in six appeals. See Besaraba v. State,
656 So. 2d 441 (Fla. 1995); Thompson v. State, 647 So. 2d 824 (Fla. 1994); Spencer v. State,
645 So. 2d 377 (Fla. 1994); Pietri v. State, 644 So. 2d 1347 (Fla. 1994), cert. denied, 115
S. Ct. 2588 (1995); Castro v. State, 644 So. 2d 987 (Fla. 1994); Wyatt v. State, 641 So. 2d
1336 (Fla. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1983 (1995). In several other cases, the court
reversed convictions or sentences without approving or disapproving the trial court's use of
the circumstance.
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In Jackson v. State,'' the court summarized the requirements of the
circumstance: 1) the killing was the product of cool and calm reflection
rather than of emotional frenzy, panic, or a fit of rage; 2) there was a careful
plan or prearranged design to commit murder before the fatal incident; 3)
the defendant had a "heightened" level of premeditation over and above
what is required for unaggravated first-degree murder; and 4) there must be
no "pretense of moral or legal justification," meaning a colorable claim of
some excuse, justification, or incomplete defense to the murder."°
It is easiest to apply the circumstance where the defendant has
previously announced his intention to commit murder. Thus, there could be
no dispute about its use in Fennie where the defendant, after forcing a
woman into the trunk of a car, drove around telling others he was going to
kill the woman. 3
At the other extreme, as noted in Jackson, are cases where the
defendant acts out a state of profound mental agitation which belies any
claim of cold-bloodedness."
Thus, the court disapproved the circumstance in Spencer v. State,"5 where, although there was "evidence that
Spencer contemplated this murder in advance, we find that the evidence
offered in support of the mental mitigating circumstances also negates the
cold component of the CCP aggravator."'' 6 As may be recalled, the trial
101. 648 So. 2d 85 (Fla. 1994).
102. Id. at 89. The most acceptable "pretense of moral or legal justification" is that the
defendant, while committing a violent felony, killed the victim in order to defend himself.
Banda v. State, 536 So. 2d 221, 224-25 (Fla. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1087 (1989).
Some pretenses of justification rejected by the court are: defendant poisoned neighbor to get
her family to move, Trepal v. State, 621 So. 2d 1361 (Fla. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.
892 (1994); defendant was retarded, Hall v. State, 614 So. 2d 473 (Fla.), cert. denied, 114
S. Ct. 109 (1993); defendant murdered daughter as way of getting back at wife, Klokoc v.
State, 589 So. 2d 219 (Fla. 1991); considering himself protector of the black community,
defendant murdered Iranian shopkeeper's brother, Gunsby v. State, 574 So. 2d 1085 (Fla.)
(indicating through dicta that attempting to rid neighborhood of drug dealers might be
reasonable pretense), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 843 (1991).
103. See also Griffin v. State, 639 So. 2d 966 (1994), cert. denied, 115 5. Ct. 1317
(1995) (before shootout with police, defendant said he was not going back to jail).
104. Jackson, 648 So. 2d at 89.
105. 645 So. 2d 377 (Fla. 1994).
106. Id. at 384. In fact, there was substantial evidence of premeditation-Spencer
repeatedly said that he was going to kill his wife in the weeks leading up to the murder. Id.
at 379; see also Besaraba v. State, 656 So. 2d 441 (Fla. 1995). A half hour after being
evicted from a bus, Joseph Besaraba confronted the driver at a bus terminal, shooting him
and a passenger dead and then shooting a man while stealing a getaway car. The court
struck the circumstance because "the random nature of Besaraba's acts during the crimes
belies a careful plan" and the trial court found "strong mental health mitigating circumstances
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court had rejected unrebutted expert opinion testimony respecting statutory
mental mitigating circumstances.' 0 7
In between, there are many cases in which the exact events of the fatal
episode and the defendant's state of mind are in dispute. In some cases, the
court defers to the trial court's resolution of uncertainties in the evidence,
but in others it applies a rule that the state must conclusively rebut
hypotheses contrary to the circumstance's application.
The court took the first approach in one of Aileen Wuomos' cases.'Os
In a thorough discussion of each of the four elements of the circumstance,
the court noted that the defense evidence, if believed, would rebut each
element."° Nevertheless, the court approved the finding of the circumstance, writing that the jury and trial judge could accept the State's theory
of the case and reject-the defendant's "testimony as self-serving, unbelievable in light of Wuomos' constantly changing confessions, contrary to the
facts that could be inferred from the similar crimes evidence, or contrary to
other facts adduced at trial."' "°
The court took the opposite approach in the case of Derek Todd
Thompson."' The trial court had determined that Thompson's murder of a
store clerk during a robbery was cold, calculated, and premeditated." 2
The supreme court reversed, noting that while a witness saw Thompson
enter the shop and talk with the clerk, she was looking away when she heard
the gun fire:
No one saw the actual shooting .... A number of scenarios inconsistent with heightened premeditation are possible: The victim may have
struggled with Thompson; the victim may have tried to duck and hide
from Thompson; or the victim may have tried to escape. The record
simply does not show what happened in the brief time span when the
witness looked away."'
that weigh against the formulating of a careful plan to kill" the bus driver. Id. at 445.
"Although the record may reflect a suspicion that [a careful plan to kill] existed," the court
determined that "it is plausible that Besaraba acted impulsively." Id. at 446. But see
Thompson v. State, 648 So.2d 692 (Fla. 1994) (upholding circumstance notwithstanding thai
trial court found in mitigation that retarded defendant had chronic mental illness and acted
under "moderate" disturbance at time of murder), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2283 (1995).
107. Spencer, 645 So. 2d at 380.

108. Wuomos v. State, 644 So. 2d 1000 (Fla.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1705 (1995).
109. Id. at 1008.
110. Id.

111. Thompson v. State, 647 So. 2d 824 (Fla. 1994).
112. Id. at 826.
113. Id.
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As already noted, the court took a similar approach in Besaraba ("it is
plausible that Besaraba acted impulsively")."'
Sometimes there does not seem to be any principled reason for the
court's ruling on the circumstance. One would be hard pressed to explain
why one of the two following horrible sets of facts is more "cold-blooded"
than the other:
The evidence shows that the victims were subjected to at least twenty
minutes of abuse prior to their deaths. Wyatt pistol-whipped William
Edwards when the safe did not contain enough money for his satisfaction. Wyatt also undressed Frances Edwards completely and raped her
a short distance from where the other two employees were being held.
Wyatt then killed his victims in front of each other. William Edwards
begged for his life and stated that he and Frances, his wife, had a twoyear-old daughter at home. Wyatt shot him in the chest. Upon seeing
her husband shot, Frances Edwards began to cry and Wyatt then shot
her in the head while she was in a kneeling position. Having witnessed
the shooting of his co-workers, Michael Bornoosh started to pray.
Wyatt put his gun to Bornoosh's ear and before he pulled the trigger
told him to listen real close to hear the bullet coming. When Wyatt
realized William Edwards was still alive he went back and shot him in
the head."'
Walls indicated that he deliberately woke up the two victims by
knocking over a fan after entering the house to commit a burglary.
Then he forced Alger to lie on the floor and made Peterson tie him up
so that his hands were "behind the back, ankles shackled." He next
forced Peterson to lie on the floor so he could tie her up in the same
manner.
Walls stated that Alger later got loose from his bindings and
attacked Walls. During the fight, Walls tackled Alger, forced him to
the floor, and "caught [Alger] across the throat with the knife." Alger
continued struggling with Walls and succeeded in biting him on the leg.
At this point, Walls apparently dropped his knife. Walls then pulled out
his gun and shot Alger several times in the head.
Walls returned to Peterson. He found her "laying in there crying
and everything, asked--asked me some questions." Walls said he could
not understand what she was saying, so he removed her gag. She asked
if Alger was all right. Walls said:

114. Besaraba, 656 So. 2d at 446.

115. Wyatt v. State, 641 So. 2d 1336, 1340-41 (1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1983
(1995).
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I told her no. I told her what was going on, and I said,
"I came in here, and I didn't want to hurt none of y'all. I
didn't want to hurt you, but he attacked my ass, and things
just happened."
Walls then untied Peterson, and "started wrestling around with her."
During this second struggle, he ripped off Peterson's clothing. Walls'
confession stated:
[Peterson] was like curled up crying like. I don't know, I
guess I was paranoid and everything. I didn't want no, uh, no
witnesses.
I---all I know is just-all I know I just went out, and I just
pulled the trigger a couple of times right there behind her
head.
I mean close range, I mean shit, it's got powder burns
(unintelligible) and everything.
Walls stated that after the first shot, Peterson was "doing all kinds of
screaming." He then forced
her face into a pillow and shot her a
6
second time in the head."
The court struck the circumstance
Walls.118

in Wyatt" 7 but approved it in

IV. MITIGATION

A. Right to Present Mitigation
In Guzman v. State,119 the court went out of its way to emphasize in
dicta the right of the defense to present evidence of mitigation: "trial judges
should be extremely cautious when denying defendants the opportunity to
present testimony or evidence on their behalf, especially where a defendant

is on trial for his or her life." 120

116.
(1995).
117.
118.
119.
120.

Walls v. State, 641 So. 2d at 381, 384-85 (1994), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 943
Wyatt, 641 So. 2d at 1341.
Walls, 641 So. 2d at 389.
644 So. 2d 996 (Fla. 1994).
Id. at 1000.
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B. Disparate Treatment of Others
The court ruled in several cases on arguments that a co-defendant's life
sentenGe constitutes a mitigating circumstance. In Barrett v. State,' a
quadruple homicide case, the court held that the jury could have rationally
based its life verdicts on the life sentences received by one of John C.
Barrett's co-defendants." The court also wrote that
[t]he jury could have reasonably concluded that Barrett was not the
person who actually committed the murders, and that Burnside had
committed the murders with the help of someone other than Barrett.
Conflicting evidence on the identity of the actual killer can form the
basis for a recommendation of life imprisonment."
In Heath v. State," on the other hand, the supreme court affirmed
the trial court's conclusion that the co-defendant's life sentence did not
outweigh the aggravating circumstances" z since, according to the codefendant's testimony, the defendant was the dominating force in the

murder. 126
In Gamble v. State,27 the court was presented with a procedural twist
on this issue. Guy R. Gamble and Michael Love carefully planned and
carried out the murder of their landlord. After a jury convicted Gamble and
recommended that he be sentenced to death, Love entered a guilty plea and
was sentenced to life imprisonment. Rejecting Gamble's argument that
Love's sentence could have provided a basis for a life recommendation from
the jury, the supreme court wrote:
The trial court found two aggravating factors (cold, calculated, and
premeditated and pecuniary gain), one statutory mitigating factor (age),
and several non-statutory mitigating factors, most of which were given
little weight. One of the non-statutory mitigating factors given "some"
weight was Love's sentence of life. Gamble asserts that his jury would
have also recommended a life sentence if it had been informed of
Love's sentence. Gamble proffers that this factor singlehandedly
121. 649 So. 2d 219 (Fla. 1994).
122. Id. at 223.
123. Id. (citing Cooper v. State, 581 So. 2d 49, 51 (Fla. 1991)).
124. 648 So. 2d 660 (Fla. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2618 (1995).
125. Prior conviction of a violent felony (second-degree murder) and commission of
murder during course of violent felony. Id. at 663.
126. Id. at 665-66.
127. 659 So. 2d 242 (Fla. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 933 (1996).
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requires a sentence reduction. We disagree. Love's sentence was based
on a guilty plea entered after Gamble's penalty phase proceedings.
Clearly the Gamble trial judge was not required to postpone Gamble's
sentencing and await Love's plea and sentence. We refuse to speculate
as to what may have occurred had the Gamble jury been made aware
of the posture of Love's case. We find no error relative to the
28
issue.
C. Consecutive Life Sentences
The supreme court seems to have two rules respecting the mitigating
effect of consecutive life sentences. 29 In Nixon v. State,'3" Joe Elton
Nixon was convicted of first-degree murder and several noncapital offenses
for which he could receive life sentences. The trial court refused his request
for a penalty phase jury instruction on the penalties for the noncapital
offenses. 31 On appeal, the supreme court rejected his argument that the
refusal prevented the jury from considering in mitigation, the fact that life
sentences on the other offenses would prevent his ever being released from
prison.13 "The fact that Nixon was convicted of three other offenses each
of which carried lengthy maximum penalties is irrelevant to his character,
133
prior record, or the circumstances of the crime."'
In Jones v. State,TM on the other hand, the court ruled that the trial
court erred in refusing to let Randall Scott Jones argue in mitigation that,
since he was convicted of two first-degree murders, consecutive life
35
sentences would prevent him from ever being released from prison.
The court stated,
[c]ounsel was entitled to argue to the jury that Jones may be removed
from society for at least fifty years should he receive life sentences on
each of the two murders. The potential sentence is a relevant consider-

128. Id. at 245. Compare Scott v. Dugger, 604 So. 2d 465, 468 (Fla. 1992) (codefendant's subsequent life sentence could form basis for reduction of sentence to life
imprisonment in postconviction proceedings).
129. The theory of mitigation is that consecutive sentences will ensure that the defendant
will not be released into society.
130. 572 So. 2d 1336 (Fla. 1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 854 (1991).
131. Id. at 1344-45.
132. Id. at 1345.
133. Id.
134. 569 So. 2d 1234 (Fla. 1990).
135. Id. at 1239-40.
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ation of "the circumstances of
the offense" which the jury may not be
36
prevented from considering.'
During the survey period the court ruled, consistently with Jones, that a jury
can reasonably base a life sentence on the fact that consecutive life
sentences will assure that the defendant will never be released in prison. In
the double homicide case of Turner v. State,' the court found that the
trial court had failed to consider the mitigating effect of consecutive life
3
sentences for the two murders in overriding a jury life recommendation. 1
The court specifically wrote that among the "ample mitigation" supporting
the life verdict was the fact that "the alternative to the death penalty was
two life sentences, which the jury knew would have required Turner to serve
a minimum of fifty years in prison before he could be considered for
13 9
parole.9
D. Statutory Versus "Nonstatutory" Mitigation
Under Hitchcock v. Dugger,14 mitigation may not be limited to the
"statutory circumstances" listed in section 921.141 of the Florida Statutes."' Nevertheless, the supreme court sometimes considers statutory
circumstances somehow more important that nonstatutory circumstances.
For instance, in Foster v. State,142 a case in which the trial court found
fourteen nonstatutory mitigating circumstances, the supreme court found the
use of an unconstitutional jury instruction on the coldness circumstance
harmless, and wrote:
In view of the fact that the trial court found no statutory mitigators and
three strong aggravators, we also find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that
the invalid CCP instruction did not affect the jury's consideration and

136. Id. at 1239-40. In Simmons v. South Carolina, 114 S.Ct. 2187 (1994), the
Supreme Court held that, where the state had put in issue the future dangerousness of the
defendant, the trial court violated due process in preventing the defense from informing the
jury that the defendant would not be eligible for parole. Id.at 2193. The Court declined to
decide whether a defendant's ineligibility for parole is a mitigating circumstance for purposes
of the eighth amendment requirement that the sentencer consider all mitigating evidence. Id.
at 2196-97.
137. 645 So. 2d 444 (Fla. 1994).
138. Id. at 448.
139. Id.
140. 481 U.S. 393 (1987).
141. Id. at 398-99.
142. 654 So. 2d 112 (Fla.), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 314 (1995).
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that its recommendation would have 143been the same if the requested
expanded instruction had been given.
E.

Waiver of Mitigation

A growing number of cases have involved defendants who prevent
presentation of mitigation or even demand to be executed. Koon v.
Dugger 44 established the circumstances in which the trial court should
allow defense counsel to waive presentation of mitigation:
When a defendant, against his counsel's advice, refuses to permit the
presentation of mitigating evidence in the penalty phase, counsel must
inform the court on the record of the defendant's decision. Counsel
must indicate whether, based on his investigation, he reasonably
believes there to be mitigating evidence that could be presented and
what that evidence would be. The court should then require the
defendant to confirm on the record that his counsel has discussed these
matters with him, and despite counsel's recommendation,
he wishes to
145
waive presentation of penalty phase evidence.
As may be expected, such cases may involve murders arising from
tormented domestic relationships and those committed by mentally disturbed
persons. Typical is Layman v. State. 46 The evidence showed that
Gregory Scott Layman ambushed his estranged girlfriend, Sharon DePaula,
shooting her twice with a sawed-off shotgun. He confessed to the crime and
said he wanted to die for it. At the penalty proceeding, when the State
announced that it was not seeking death, Mr. Layman objected, insisting that
he be sentenced to death. After the State presented no evidence in
aggravation, "Layman, representing himself, then addressed the jury and said
that he wanted to die for several reasons: He had a history of committing
violence against Sharon; the murder was cold, calculated and premeditated;
and he still loved Sharon deeply and wanted to be with her in the afterlife." 47 The jury rendered a death verdict, which the trial court fol-

143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Id. at 115 (emphasis added).
619 So. 2d 246 (Fla. 1993).
Id. at 250.
652 So. 2d 373 (Fla. 1995).
Id. at 374.
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lowed. 4 However, the supreme court reversed the sentence because of
defects in the rendition of the sentencing order.'49
The court affirmed death sentences in the following cases which
involved various waivers of mitigation. Farr v. State,"s° discussed at
length the issue of waiver of mitigation. The case was before the court after
a remand for resentencing."5 At resentencing, "Farr forbade his attorney
to present a case for mitigation on remand and... himself took the witness
stand and systematically refuted, belied, or disclaimed virtually the entire
The court
case for mitigation that existed in the earlier appeal."'
determined that under these circumstances, the trial court did not err in
rejecting the case for mitigation.
After some discussion, the court wrote:
It deserves emphasis, however, that the ability of a capital
defendant to restrict counsel's argument is not without limit. It is true
that the right to counsel embodies a right of self-determination in the
face of specific criminal charges. At the trial level, this certainly means
that "defendants have a right to control their own destinies" when facing
the death penalty. Nevertheless, there are countervailing interests that
must be honored.
In Klokoc, for example, we addressed the problem that can arise
when a death-sentenced defendant attempts to restrict the argument of
appellate counsel in this Court. The Florida Constitution imposes upon
the Court an absolute obligation of determining whether death is a

148. Id.
149. Id. at 375-76.
150. 656 So. 2d 448 (Fla. 1995).
151. See Farr, 621 So. 2d 1368 (Fla. 1993). The 1993 opinion shows: after injuring
two women by gunshot during a kidnap attempt outside a bar, Victor Marcus Farr
commandeered a car with a man and woman inside. The man escaped, and the defendant
drove the car into a tree in an attempt to kill himself and the woman. He lived, she died.
He plead guilty, waived the sentencing jury, and asked for a death sentence. The supreme
court found the defendant's waiver of mitigation valid, but nevertheless ordered resentencing
court had erred by failing to consider mitigation contained in psychiatric and
because the trial
presentence investigation (PSI) reports, writing:
We repeatedly have stated that mitigating evidence must be considered and
weighed when contained anywhere in the record, to the extent it is believable
and uncontroverted. That requirement applies with no less force when a
defendant argues in favor of the death penalty, and even if the defendant asks
the court not to consider mitigating evidence.
Id. at 1369 (citations omitted).
152. Farr,656 So. 2d at 449.
153. Id. at 450.
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proportionate penalty. For that reason, appeals from death penalties are
both automatic and mandatory, and cannot be rendered illusory for any
reason. Thus, the Klokoc Court held that appellate counsel must
proceed with a proper adversarial argument notwithstanding the
defendant's instruction to dismiss the appeal or to acquiesce to the death
penalty.
We acknowledge that this is a troubling area of the law. On a
case-by-case basis, we have attempted to achieve a solution that both
honors the defendant's right of self-determination and the constitutional
requirement that death be imposed reliably and proportionately. While
there are no simple solutions, we do strongly believe that trial courts
would be wise to order presentence investigations in at least those'-cases
in which the defendant essentially is not challenging imposition of the
death penalty. Nevertheless, the failure to order one cannot be considered error in light of a defendant's refusal to seriously challenge death
as a penalty.'54
In a special concurrence joined by Justices Shaw and Kogan, Justice
Anstead wrote that he would "adopt a uniform rule that requires a presentence investigation and report in all capital cases. Our failure to adopt such
a requirement is tantamount to inviting arbitrary decision-making at both the
trial and appellate levels in a significant number of cases."' 55 Justice
Kogan (joined by Justice Anstead) dissented in part, writing:
Our analysis of these cases is at best criticizable. There could be
a variety of solutions, but all are problematic. One would be to recede
from Klokoc, which would result in appeals such as Mr. Farr's
becoming perfunctory affirmances. This clearly would increase the
proportionality problem but would more fully honor rule 9.140(b)(3).
Another would be to adopt Justice Barkett's approach in Hamblen,
which would increase the restriction on the defendant's right of selfdetermination yet would more fully satisfy the proportionality doctrine.
Yet the latter approach would not fully honor rule 9.140(b)(3). Part of
the problem could be eliminated simply by requiring a presentence
investigation in every case in which death is imposed, including those
in which a defendant does not seriously challenge imposition of the
death penalty. I would so order. On this point, I dissent from the
majority.
A time is coming when this Court must comprehensively address
the problem of defendants who seek the death penalty, whose numbers

154. Id. (citations omitted).
155. Id. at 450-51.
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are growing. We have reached the stage at which our holdings are not
entirely consistent with each other or with our own rules of court.
Case-by-case adjudication of a larger problem certainly has its place,
but not when the result is a confounding of the overall law: a point we
are rapidly reaching.
I personally would favor referring the entire matter to one of The
Florida Bar's standing rules committees or to a committee or Court
commission created especially to investigate this problem. This Court
has inherent authority to promulgate rules of procedure, which could
include a new procedural framework for dealing with defendants who
favor their own executions. Our piecemeal approach to cases like Farr's
has not adequately addressed all the problems at hand, and I believe the
time is approaching for a comprehensive study and the development of
one or more proposals for reform, with adequate input from all
segments of the public and the Bar. I therefore would refer this issue
to the Criminal Procedure Rules Committee of The Florida Bar for
more intensive
study and formulation of a recommendation to the
56
Court.

Like Layman, Windom v. State,"s ' involved a seriously disturbed
defendant. Curtis Windom shot a man on a street corner, ran to his
(Windom's) girlfriend's house, shot her, and later shot the girlfriend's
mother while she was driving down the street. All three died. He also shot
another man in the street who survived. According to the sentencing order,
the survivor "said the Defendant did not look normal-his eyes were
'bugged out like he had clicked."" 58 Windom waived presentation of
mitigation under odd circumstances:
In this triple murder, the defendant made a knowing waiver of
presenting any mitigating evidence to the advisory jury. The defendant
did this in order to avoid any evidence being presented to the jury
concerning the murders being related to the defendant trafficking in
cocaine. The trial judge elicited a direct confirmation from the
defendant that he understood that he was waiving his right to present
mitigating evidence and that the159reason was so that the "drug thing"
would not be heard by the jury.

156.
157.
158.
159.

Id. at 452-53.
656 So. 2d 432 (Fla.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 571 (1995).
Id. at 435.
Id. at 438-39.
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Lockhart v. State"6 presented an entirely different picture. Michael
Lee Lockhart, "inflicted a number of wounds described as pricking,
prodding, or teasing wounds" on a fourteen-year-old girl, and then bound,
stabbed, strangled, and raped her.161 After the judge denied defense
counsel's motion to withdraw, 62 the defendant sought to discharge
counsel, plead guilty, and refused to present mitigation.
The defendant in Pittman v. State,'63 according to the trial court's
findings in mitigation, had a hyperactive personality, may have suffered
physical and sexual abuse as a child, and was an impulsive person with
memory problems and impaired social judgment."6 A jury convicted him
of three counts of first-degree murder on evidence that he repeatedly stabbed
his estranged wife's parents and sister and burned their house. After the
jury recommended death sentences for all three murders, the defense
inexplicably failed to produce
evidence (or argument apparently) to support
65
override life sentences.1
V. JURY INSTRUCTIONS
In Guzman v. State,'" the court wrote in dicta:
By this opinion, we direct that trial judges fully instruct death penalty
juries on all applicable jury instructions set forth in the Florida Standard
Jury Instructions unless a legal justification exists to modify an
instruction. If a legal need to modify an instruction exists, that need
should be fully reflected in the record in accordance with Florida Rule
of Criminal Procedure 3.985.167

The court also followed this doctrine of adherence to the standard jury
instructions in Gamble, rejecting arguments that

160. 655 So. 2d 69 (Fla.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 250 (1995).
161. Id. at 71.
162. On the motion, counsel argued "that he could not be ready when trial started
because of his workload, the complexity of the case, and the travel required due to
Lockhart's out-of-state convictions." l The out-of-state convictions included convictions
for murder in Texas and Indiana. Id. at 71 n.2.
163. 646 So. 2d 167 (Fla. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1982 (1995).
164. Id. at 170 n.2. There was also evidence that he had been a difficult child, with
severe attention deficit disorder and hyperactivity, that his mother disciplined him severely,
and that he was a paranoid schizophrenic and had organic personality disorder. Id. at 169.
165. Pittman, 646 So. 2d at 172.
166. 644 So. 2d 996 (Fla. 1994).
167. Id. at 1000.
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the standard jury instructions fail to: (1) inform the jury that even if an
aggravating circumstance is proven beyond a reasonable doubt, they
may still recommend life imprisonment; (2) adequately define mitigating
circumstances; and (3) inform the jury that it could find mental
impairment even if it failed to conclude that such impairment was
extreme.

168

In Chaky v. State,69 there was an unusual failure by the trial court
to reduce its instructions to the jury to writing and send them into the jury
room for use during deliberations. 7 ' While determining that Chaky's
lawyer had failed to preserve the matter for appeal, the court noted that the
trial court had violated the requirement of rule 3.390(b) of the FloridaRules
of Criminal Procedure,that jury instructions "in capital cases shall.., be
in writing.. 7. The court also noted that rule 3.400(c) gave the trial court
the discretion to send a copy of the instructions into the jury room."
With its decision in Chaky, the court then issued a comment seeking to
promulgate a proposed rule amending rule 3.400(c), which would make the
rule mandatory for instructions in all capital cases.'73
VI. THE SENTENCING ORDER
A. Campbell v. State
During the survey period, the court continued to be troubled by fallout
from its decision in Campbell v. State. 74 In Campbell the court wrote:
When addressing mitigating circumstances, the sentencing court
must expressly evaluate in its written order each mitigating circumstance
proposed by the defendant to determine whether it is supported by the
evidence and whether, in the case of nonstatutory factors, it is truly of
a mitigating nature. The court must find as a mitigating circumstance
each proposed factor that is mitigating in nature and has been reasonably established by the greater weight of the evidence: "A mitigating
circumstance need not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt by the

168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
Criminal
174.

Gamble v. State, 659 So. 2d 242, 246 (Fla. 1995).
651 So. 2d 1169 (Fla. 1995).
Id. at 1169.
Id. at 1172 (quoting FLA. R. CumI. P. 3.390(b)).
Id.
Id. The court did go on to adopt this mandatory rule. In re Florida Rules of
Procedure - Rule 3.400, 657 So. 2d 1134 (Fla. 1995).
571 So. 2d 415 (Fla. 1990).
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defendant. If you are reasonably convinced that a mitigating circumstance exists, you may consider it as established." The court next must
weigh the aggravating circumstances against the mitigating and, in order
to facilitate appellate review, must expressly consider in its written
order each established mitigating circumstance. Although the relative
weight given each mitigating factor is within the province of the
sentencing court, a mitigating factor once found cannot be dismissed as
having no weight.175
In Ferrell v. State,7 6 the court took a strong stand on strict adherence
to Campbell:
We now find it necessary to further emphasize the requirements
established in Campbell. The sentencing judge must expressly evaluate
in his or her written sentencing order each statutory and non-statutory
mitigating circumstance proposed by the defendant. This evaluation
must determine if the statutory mitigating circumstance is supported by
the evidence and if the non-statutory mitigating circumstance is truly of
a mitigating nature. A mitigator is supported by evidence if it is
mitigating in nature and reasonably established by the greater weight of
the evidence. Once established, the mitigator is weighed against any
aggravating circumstances. It is within the sentencing judge's discretion
to determine the relative weight given to each established mitigator;
however, some weight must be given to all established mitigators. The
result of this weighing process must be detailed in the written sentencing order and supported by sufficient competent evidence in the record.
The absence of any of the enumerated requirements deprives this Court
of the opportunity for meaningful review.'77
In Green v. State, 7 ' however, the court was less concerned about its
ability to conduct a meaningful review of the death sentence: "Although the
sentencing order might not comply strictly with the requirements of
Campbell, the trial judge clearly gave careful consideration to the mitigating
'
Similarly, in Lowe v. State, 8 ° the court wrote that while it
factors."179
"might take issue" with the trial court's rejection of unrebutted mitigation,

175. Id. at 419-20 (citations omitted) (footnotes omitted).
176. 653 So. 2d 367 (Fla. 1995).
177. Id. at 371; see also Larkins v. State, 655 So. 2d 95 (Fla. 1995); Layman v. State,
652 So. 2d 373 (Fla. 1995).
178. 641 So. 2d 391 (Fla. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1120 (1995).
179. Id. at 396.
180. 650 So. 2d 969 (Fla. 1994), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 230 (1995).
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it nevertheless affirmed the death sentence because "the trial judge also
stated that, even if these factors were of a mitigating nature, they 'would not
outweigh the aggravating circumstances of committing a prior robbery and
committing a murder during the commission of another attempted robbery. , ', s
Justice Wells, in a dissent in Crump v. State,"s joined by Chief
Justice Grimes, registered a vigorous disapproval of Campbell, writing that
to Campbell was
the court's decision remanding for resentencing pursuant
' 3
"just one more procedural impediment to finality.'
B.

Timing

Section 921.141 of the Florida Statutes does not state when the trial
court is to render its sentencing order, although the context makes clear that
it is to do so after the penalty verdict.' 84 The supreme court has developed two rules respecting the timing of the rendition of the sentencing order.
In Grossman v. State,' the court ruled that the court must render the
written sentencing order at the time that it pronounces the sentence.186 In
Spencer v. State,'87 the court decided that the court is not to render its
decision until after a post penalty verdict hearing (sometimes called an
"allocution hearing" or, now, a "Spencer hearing") at which it has heard
such additional argument and evidence as the parties may present.'
While a violation of Grossman requires reduction of the sentence to one of
life imprisonment,' 89 a violation of Spencer apparently requires only
resentencing.
In Perez v. State"9 and Layman v. State, 9' the court followed
Grossmanand ordered that death sentences be reduced to life imprisonment.
181. Id. at 976; see also Coney v. State, 653 So. 2d 1009 (Fla. 1995).
182. 654 So. 2d 545 (Fla. 1995).
183. Id. at 549. But see Bryant v. State, 656 So.2d 426 (Fla. 1995). Justice Wells again
joined by the Chief Justice, agreed in an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part that
the sentence be reversed under Campbell Id, at 429-30. Bryant was decided two weeks
before Crump.

184. FLA. STAT. § 921.141.
185. 525 So. 2d 833 (Fla. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1071 (1989).
186. Id. at 841.
187. 615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993).
188. Id. at 690-91. However, Spencer merely formalized what had already been the
practice in most if not all circuits.
189. E.g., Christopher v. State, 583 So. 2d 642 (Fla. 1991).
190. 648 So. 2d 715, 720 (Fla. 1995).
191. 652 So. 2d 373, 376 (Fla. 1995).
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In Layman, Justice Wells again issued a strongly worded dissent, contending, "[s]anctions such as the one imposed by these cases have too heavy a
price in the public's loss of confidence in the judicial system. I would
recede from this sanction."'9
In Armstrong v. State,193 the court declined to apply Spencer to a
sentencing which occurred before Spencer was decided.
VII. APPELLATE REVIEW
A.

Tedder v. State

Although section 921.141 of the Florida Statutes lets the trial court
impose a death sentence notwithstanding a life verdict, 194 the supreme
court has ruled that it will affirm such an "override" sentence only where
virtually no reasonable person could disagree with the death sentence. 95
In keeping with this rule, the supreme court reversed most override death
sentences that came before it during the survey period."9
The court's method of appellate review in override cases differs
substantially from its review in death verdict cases. In the latter, the court
usually defers to the trial court's decisions of minimizing or disregarding
mitigation. 97 But in override cases, it usually acts on the assumption that
the jury has accepted all mitigation presented to it and has given it sufficient
weight to outweigh the state's case for death. 9 As shown in the preceding footnote, the court will reverse override sentences even in horrendous

192. Id. at 377 (Wells, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
193. 642 So. 2d 730 (Fla. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1799 (1995).
194. FLA. STAT. § 921.141.

195. Tedder v. State, 322 So. 2d 908, 910 (Fla. 1975).
196. The court reduced override sentences in five cases pursuant to Tedder. See Barrett
v. State, 649 So. 2d 219 (Fla. 1994) (quadruple homicide); Caruso v. State, 645 So. 2d 389
(Fla. 1994) (double homicide); Turner v. State, 645 So. 2d 444 (Fla. 1994) (double
homicide); Parker v. State, 643 So. 2d 1032 (Fla. 1994) (triple homicide); Esty v. State, 642
So. 2d 1074 (Fla. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 1380 (1995). In Perez, also an override
case, the court reduced the sentence under Grossman without reaching the Tedder issue.
Perez, 648 So. 2d at 720. The court has also affirmed override sentences in two cases:
Washington v. State, 653 So. 2d 362 (Fla. 1994), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 387 (1995); Garcia

v. State, 644 So. 2d 59 (Fla. 1994) (affirming one override death sentence and one death
sentence following death recommendation), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 1799 (1995).

197. E.g., Lowe v. State, 650 So. 2d 969, 976-77 (Fla. 1994); Green v. State, 641 So.
2d 391, 395-96 (Fla. 1994).
198. E.g., Barrett, 649 So. 2d at 223.
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cases involving multiple homicides.' 99 Thus, the penalty verdict continues
to be of paramount importance to the ultimate disposition of the case.

B. Clemons v. Mississippi and Espinosa v. Florida
Where the sentencer has employed an improper aggravating circumstance, the state appellate court must reverse a resulting death sentence
unless it either determines that the circumstance did not contribute to the
sentence, or it independently reweighs the remaining circumstances against
the mitigating circumstances and finds that the death sentence is still
appropriate." Since Florida shares sentencing responsibility between the
jury and judge, the state supreme court must look to the effect of a
sentencing error on both actors.201 Espinosa disapproved the Florida
court's practice of considering only the effect of an error on the judge's
sentencing decision."
Although the court has in the past repeatedly
asserted that it will not reweigh sentencing circumstances,0 3 it seems to
have done so during the survey period.
In Hill v. State,2" a federal district court partially granted the writ of
habeas corpus after finding that, in affirming Clarence Edward Hill's death
sentence after striking an aggravating circumstance, the state supreme court

199. See cases cited supra note 196.
200. Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222 (1992); Parker v. Dugger, 498 U.S. 308 (1991);
Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738 (1990).
201. Espinosa v. Florida, 505 U.S. 1079 (1992).
202. Id. at 1082.
203. "mhe Florida Supreme Court has made it clear on several occasions that it does
not reweigh the evidence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances." Parker,498 U.S.
at 319. The state court has held that it complies with Clemons by the second alternative,
harmless error analysis. White v. Dugger, 565 So. 2d 700, 702 (Fla. 1990); Preston v. State,
564 So. 2d 120, 123 (Fla. 1990). The court sees itself as "a reviewing court, not a factfinding court," so that it defers to the findings of the trial court. Lucas v. State, 568 So. 2d
18, 23 (Fla. 1990).
The court's strong stance against reweighing arises from the extraordinary case of
Brown v. Wainwright, 392 So. 2d 1327 (Fla. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1000 (1981)
which involved the "alleged impropriety" of the supreme court's practice in capital cases of
reviewing secret Department of Corrections documents not available to counsel and not
contained in the appellate record. Id. at 1328. Some 122 death row inmates joined Joseph
Green Brown in protesting this practice. Without denying that it had such an ongoing
practice, the court ruled that, since it is a reviewing rather than a sentencing court, it could
not engage in "weighing or reevaluating the evidence adduced to establish aggravating and
mitigating circumstances." Id. at 1331. Hence, it wrote that its review of matters dehors the
record could not affect its appellate review of the death sentence. Id. at 1332.
204. 643 So. 2d 1071 (Fla. 1994), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 196 (1995).
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had violated Parker v. Dugger"° and may have also violated Clemons in
failing to consider uncontroverted mitigating evidence. °6 Permitting Hill
to reopen his appeal for the limited purpose of addressing the issues raised
in the federal court decision, the supreme court again affirmed the death
sentence, writing:
four of the five aggravating circumstances found by the trial judge
remain valid. Even when we consider the statutory mitigating circumstance of Hill's age of twenty-three at the time the murder was
committed and the uncontroverted evidence of non-statutory mitigating
circumstances presented by Hill at sentencing regarding his background,
we must conclude that the trial judge's error in finding that the murder
was cold, calculated, and premeditated, was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt. In aggravation, the evidence reflects that Hill, during
the course of a robbery, killed a police officer so that he and his
accomplice could escape prosecution. Moreover, Hill had previously
been convicted of robbery with a firearm, and, in this case, he knowingly created a great risk of death to many persons by firing a number of
shots in a populated area. We again hold that death is the appropriate
sentence in this case because no reasonable possibility exists that the
evidence presented in mitigation, such as Hill's age, his good work
history, and his helpful and nonviolent nature, is sufficient to outweigh
the four valid aggravating circumstances. 2'
Similarly, in Castro v. State,"8 after striking the coldness circum-

stance, the court affirmed the death sentence writing that there remained
three valid aggravating circumstances and only a "weak case for mitiga-

tion." 209

The court also seemed to engage in reweighing in Wuornos v.

State,21 ° writing that the trial court's failure to find and weigh nonstatutory
circumstances was harmless "because their weight is slight when compared

with the case for aggravation."211

205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.

See supra note 200.
Hill, 643 So. 2d at 1072-73.
Id. at 1074 (footnotes omitted).
644 So. 2d 987 (Fla. 1994).
Id. at 991.
644 So. 2d 1000 (Fla. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1705 (1995).
Id. at 1011.
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C. Retroactivity
The riddle of retroactivity continued to bedevil the court during the
survey period. In Smith v. State," the court seemed to settle the matter
by writing that all of its decisions would apply retroactively to cases
pending on direct appeal. Thereafter, however, the court refused to follow
Smith and apply to pending cases its ruling213 that trial courts may not
instruct juries on flight as being indicative of the defendant's guilt.2 14 In
Wuornos v. State, 5 the court refused to follow its decision in Castro v.
State,216 in which ithad held that the court must instruct the jury not to
give double consideration to aggravating circumstances based on the same
aspect of the offense, 217 and wrote: "We read Smith to mean that new
points of law established by this Court shall be deemed retrospective with
2 8
respect to all nonfinal cases unless this Court says otherwise.""
219
But in Kearse v. State, the court retroactively applied Castro. The
court wrote that the trial court committed several errors in instructing the
penalty jury, including the refusal to give an anti-doubling instruction. 220
The court also retroactively applied its holding in Jackson, that the thenstandard instruction on the coldness circumstance was unconstitutional. 22'
It wrote that, in a case involving a pre-Jackson penalty phase, it "cannot
fault" the trial court for giving the standard instruction, but then held that
use of the standard instruction was harmful error.22
In Foster v. State,2' 3 the court retroactively applied Jackson to a
sentencing hearing that had occurred prior to an earlier remand for entry-of
a new sentencing order, writing that the death sentence was not yet
4
22

fimal.

212. 598 So. 2d 1063 (Fla. 1992).
213. Fenelon v. State, 594 So. 2d 292 (Fla. 1992).
214. E.g., Taylor v. State, 630 So. 2d 1038 (Fla. 1993) (refusing to apply Fenelon to
case pending on appeal), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 107 (1994).
215. 644 So. 2d 1000, 1007 (Fla. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 107 (1994).
216. 597 So. 2d 259 (Fla. 1992).
217. Id. at 261.
218. Wuornos, 644 So. 2d at 1007-08 n.4
219. 662 So. 2d 677 (Fla. 1995).
220. Id. at 685.
221. Id. at 686 (citing Jackson, 648 So. 2d at 901).
222. Id.
223. 654 So. 2d 112 (Fla.), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 314 (1995).
224. Id. at 115.
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The Appellate Record

Lockhart v. State,22 5 and one of Aileen Wuornos' cases 226 addressed
questions regarding a court's power to look beyond the record before it.
After Michael Lee Lockhart, as noted below, waived mitigation in the trial
court, the judge sought to find mitigation by reading newspaper articles
based on interviews of the defendant. The supreme court disapproved of
this approach.2 27
In Wuornos, after entering a plea of nolo contendere to three murder
charges, Wuomos presented at sentencing some limited hearsay evidence in
mitigation.228 On appeal, the supreme court rejected her request that the
court take judicial notice of the case in mitigation in her other case:
The entire reason for having a trial in a court of record is so that the
appellate courts of Florida may review questions of law based on a true
transcript of what occurred. While judicial notice of other proceedings
certainly is permissible in some instances, it is not proper when the
party in effect is asking that we use a wholly separate proceeding to
establish a mitigating factor that was not asserted at any time in the
proceedings below. 29
E.

Proportionality

Under Songer,23" the court will reduce a death sentence to one of life
imprisonment where there is only one aggravating circumstance to weigh
against substantial mitigation.23
During the survey period, the court
followed Songer in reducing death sentences in the following three cases.
In the case of Derek Todd Thompson,232 the court struck three of the
four aggravating circumstances supporting a death sentence for the murder

225. 655 So. 2d 69 (Fla.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 250 (1995).
226. Wuomos v. State, 644 So. 2d 1012 (Fla. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1708
(1995).

227. Lockhart, 655 So. 2d at 74.
228. Wuornos, 644 So. 2d at 1015.
229. Id. at 1019. The court has in the past looked outside the record in cases in which,
like, Gamble, a co-defendant has received a life sentence after the appellant's sentencing.
Gamble, 659 So. 2d at 245. In Witt v. State the court wrote that it could not "judicially
ignore" the subsequent life sentence of a co-defendant. 342 So. 2d 497, 500 (Fla.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 935 (1977); see also Scott v. Dugger, 604 So. 2d 465 (Fla. 1992).
230. Songer v. State, 544 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 1989).
231. Id. at 1011-12.
232. Thompson v. State, 647 So. 2d 824 (Fla. 1994).
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of a restaurant employee during a robbery. 3 This left only the felony
murder circumstance to weigh against the mitigating factors that the
defendant was a good parent and provider, had no violent propensities
before the murder, had been honorably discharged from the Navy, had been
regularly employed, was raised in the church, possessed rudimentary artistic
skills, and was a good prisoner.2
In Chaky v. State,235 the court found the prior violent felony circumstance 3 6 insufficient to outweigh mitigating evidence respecting Kenneth
Chaky's exemplary work, military, 7 family record, remorse, and potential
for rehabilitation and good prison record.238 Although the case involved
a murder arising from a troubled family relationship, the court did not
discuss its line of cases stating death is a disproportionate penalty for such
murders. 23 9
Besaraba v. State2' applied Songer to a double homicide. As
already noted, the court struck the coldness circumstance, leaving only the
prior violent felony circumstance. 241 The court found this insufficient to
outweigh mitigation that Joseph Besaraba had no significant prior criminal
history, committed the murder under the influence of a great disturbance,
had a history of substance abuse and physical and emotional problems, was
of good character and had a record of reliable employment, conducted
himself well while incarcerated, and had suffered an unstable and deprived
childhood. 22

233. Id. at 827.
234. Id. at 826 n.2. The jury voted nine to three for a death sentence. Id. at 825-26.
235. 651 So. 2d 1169 (Fla. 1995).
236. The defendant had been convicted for attempted murder while serving in the
military in Vietnam. Id. at 1171.
237. Notwithstanding the attempted murder conviction, Chaky "was restored to active
duty and eventually was honorably discharged." Id
238. Id. at 1173.
239. See Blakely v. State, 561 So. 2d 560 (1990), Garron v. State, 528 So. 2d 353, 361
(Fla. 1988), Ross v. State, 474 So. 2d 1170 (Fla. 1985).
240. 656 So. 2d 441 (Fla. 1995).
241. As to each murder, the other contemporaneous murder constituted a "prior" felony
conviction for sentencing purposes. Id. at 443 n.4.
242. Id. at 446-47. Much of his childhood was spent in Nazi concentration camps and
post-war refugee camps. Id at 446.
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Revisiting Issues

Foster v. State' 3 presents an unusual case of the court revisiting an
issue on an appeal after remand. On a previous appeal, the court rejected
a constitutional challenge to the standard jury instruction on the coldness
circumstance, 2' but remanded for the trial court to enter a new sentencing
order245 expressly evaluating mitigation under Campbell v. State2" and
Rogers v. State.247 On the appeal after the remand, the court let the
appellant re-litigate the jury instruction issue because the sentence was "not
yet final."'
VIII. CONCLUSION
The supreme court's decisions broke little new ground during the
survey period. Nevertheless, the adoption of rule 3.202 (as discussed in the
first section of this article) governing state mental examination of capital
defendants 9 promises substantial litigation in years ahead.

243. 654 So. 2d 112 (Fla. 1995).
244. Foster v. State, 614 So. 2d 455, 462 (Fla. 1992).

245. Id. at 465.
246. 571 So. 2d 415 (1990) (holding abusive and deprived childhood should be
considered in mitigation).
247. 511 So. 2d 526 (Fla. 1987) (ruling that evidence presented by the State during the
penalty phase should be limited to those matters provided by statute), cert. denied, 484 U.S.
1020 (1988).
248. Foster,654 So.2d at 115 n.6.
249. Rehearing was still pending as of April 10, 1996.
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